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Abstract 
 
This work proposes an augmented variant of DebtRank with 
uncertainty intervals as a method to investigate and assess 
systemic risk in financial networks, in a context of incomplete 
data. The algorithm is tested against a default contagion algorithm 
on three ensembles of networks with increasing density, 
estimated from real-world banking data related to the largest 227 
EU15 financial institutions indexed in a stock market. Results 
suggest that DebtRank is capable of capturing increasing rates of 
systemic risk in a more sensitive and continuous way, thereby 
acting as an early-warning signal. The paper proposes three policy 
instruments based on this approach: the monitoring of systemic 
risk over time by applying the augmented DebtRank on time 
snapshots of interbank networks, a stress-testing framework able 
to test the systemic importance of financial institutions on 
different shock scenarios, and the evaluation of distribution of 
systemic losses in currency value.  
 
 
  
3 
 
Contents 
 
 
1. Introduction ....................................................................................................................................................................... 5 
2. Background ........................................................................................................................................................................ 7 
2.1 The research question and its importance .................................................................................................. 7 
2.2 Three approaches to systemic risk ................................................................................................................. 9 
3. The model: methodology and design ................................................................................................................... 17 
3.1 Concepts and operationalisation .................................................................................................................. 17 
3.2 The network estimation module .................................................................................................................. 19 
3.3 The contagion module ....................................................................................................................................... 24 
4. The model: Implementation and results ............................................................................................................. 27 
4.1 Network ensembles and experiment settings ......................................................................................... 27 
4.2 Results ..................................................................................................................................................................... 30 
5. Policy implications ....................................................................................................................................................... 36 
6. Limitations and way forward .................................................................................................................................. 41 
7. Concluding remarks ..................................................................................................................................................... 43 
8. Bibliography .................................................................................................................................................................... 45 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
4 
 
List of Figures 
 
FIGURE 2. 1 REAL GDP DECLINE FOLLOWING A FINANCIAL CRISIS, AND DURATION OF THE DECLINE IN YEARS. ............................................. 8 
FIGURE 2.2 RISE IN UNEMPLOYMENT FOLLOWING A FINANCIAL CRISIS, AND DURATION OF THE RISE IN YEARS. ............................................ 9 
FIGURE 3.1 FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION OF BANKING DATA ............................................................................................................. 19 
FIGURE 3.2 FLOWCHART OF THE ALGORITHM ASSIGNING WEIGHTS TO THE ESTIMATED LINKS ................................................................ 22 
FIGURE 3.3 FLOWCHART OF THE NETWORK ESTIMATION MODULE ................................................................................................... 23 
FIGURE 3.4 FLOWCHART OF THE CONTAGION MODULE ................................................................................................................. 26 
FIGURE 4.1 FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTIONS OF THE DENSITY IN EACH ENSEMBLE. .................................................................................... 28 
FIGURE 4.2 NODE-DEGREE DISTRIBUTION IN EXAMPLE NETWORK FOR EACH ENSEMBLE. ...................................................................... 28 
FIGURE 4.3 EVOLUTION OF DEBTRANK AND DEFAULT CONTAGION FOR THE FIVE LARGEST BANKS FOR THE ENSEMBLE WITH 𝒌 = 1500 .......... 31 
FIGURE 4.4 EVOLUTION OF DEBTRANK AND DEFAULT CONTAGION FOR THE FIVE LARGEST BANKS FOR THE ENSEMBLE WITH 𝒌 = 3000. ......... 32 
FIGURE 4.5 EVOLUTION OF DEBTRANK AND DEFAULT CONTAGION FOR THE FIVE LARGEST BANKS FOR THE ENSEMBLE WITH 𝒌 = 5000. ......... 33 
FIGURE 4.6 FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION OF THE IMPACT EVALUATED BY THE DEFAULT CONTAGION ALGORITHM FOR NODE 1 IN THE THIRD 
ENSEMBLE ................................................................................................................................................................... 34 
FIGURE 4.7 FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION OF THE IMPACT EVALUATED BY DEBTRANK FOR NODE 1 IN THE THIRD ENSEMBLE ............................ 35 
FIGURE 5.1 STRESS-TESTING OF NODE 1 AT DIFFERENT SHOCK SCENARIOS ......................................................................................... 37 
FIGURE 5.2 RANDOM SHOCKS ON NODE 10, EXTRACTED FROM 𝑵~(𝟎. 𝟓, 𝟎. 𝟎𝟓) ............................................................................... 38 
FIGURE 5.3 LOSSES DISTRIBUTION OF NODE 1, DUE TO THE SHOCKS SIMULATED ON NODE 10 ............................................................... 39 
FIGURE 5.4 LOSSES DISTRIBUTION OF NODES 1 TO 9, DUE TO THE SHOCKS SIMULATED ON NODE 10 ...................................................... 40 
FIGURE 5.5 LOSSES DISTRIBUTION OF THE ENTIRE FINANCIAL NETWORK, DUE TO THE SHOCKS SIMULATED ON NODE 10 .............................. 40 
FIGURE 6.1 DEPICTION OF A MULTILAYER OR MULTIPLEX NETWORK ................................................................................................. 42 
 
List of Tables 
 
TABLE 2.1 CHANGE IN GDP AND AVERAGE STOCK MARKET VALUES IN SELECTED COUNTRIES. .................................................................. 8 
TABLE 2. 3 INDICATOR-BASED MEASUREMENT APPROACH TO IDENTIFY SYSTEMICALLY IMPORTANT FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS. ...................... 11 
TABLE 3.1 CONCEPTS AND RESPECTIVE OPERATIONALISATIONS ....................................................................................................... 17 
TABLE 4.1 SUMMARY STATISTICS OF THE DENSITY DISTRIBUTIONS FOR THE THREE ENSEMBLES USED IN THE EXPERIMENT ............................ 27 
 
List of Equations 
EQUATION 3.1 ANALYTICAL REPRESENTATION OF A NETWORK ........................................................................................................ 17 
EQUATION 3.2 ANALYTICAL REPRESENTATION OF A DIRECTED WEIGHTED EDGE .................................................................................. 18 
EQUATION 3.3 PROBABILITY OF THE EXISTENCE OF AN EDGE BETWEEN NODE I AND J AS A FUNCTION OF THEIR FITNESS .............................. 19 
EQUATION 3.4 RELATION BETWEEN THE LATENT FITNESS AND ITS PROXY .......................................................................................... 20 
EQUATION 3.5 PROBABILITY OF THE EXISTENCE OF AN EDGE BETWEEN NODE I AND J AS A FUNCTION OF THEIR FITNESS PROXY VALUES .......... 20 
EQUATION 3.6 THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE SUB-NETWORK SUM OF DEGREES AND THE SUM OF EDGE PROBABILITIES ......................... 20 
EQUATION 3.7 CONSTRAINTS FOR NETWORK WEIGHTS ................................................................................................................. 21 
EQUATION 3.8 IMPACT OF NODE J (THE BORROWER) TO NODE I (THE LENDER) ................................................................................... 24 
EQUATION 3.9 INITIAL CONDITIONS FOR STATE VARIABLE H AND S ................................................................................................... 24 
EQUATION 3.10 DYNAMICS OF VARIABLE H FOR DEBTRANK ........................................................................................................... 25 
EQUATION 3.11 DYNAMICS OF VARIABLE S ................................................................................................................................. 25 
EQUATION 3.12 EVALUATION OF THE SYSTEMIC IMPACT ............................................................................................................... 25 
EQUATION 3.13 DYNAMICS OF VARIABLE S THE DEFAULT CASCADE .................................................................................................. 25 
EQUATION 4.1 CHANGES IN MARKET CAPITALISATION AT EACH TIME STEP ......................................................................................... 29 
EQUATION 5.1 VALUE AT RISK ................................................................................................................................................. 37 
 
5 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The recent economic and financial crisis has – more than any previous crises in the last fifty years – 
caused uproar against and a rejection of the conventional methods of analysis of economic 
phenomena, especially with regards to finance.  The attacks have not come only from heterodox 
economics. In an interview, investor George Soros (2013) calls for a radical remaking of the discipline: 
this has now become too focused on a Newtonian-physics view of reality, with a mathematical 
formalism that is too detached from real dynamics and thus from policy.  Analogously, in his books 
Nassim Taleb (2005, 2010, 2012) provides a detailed critique of conventional economics with specific 
regards to finance: models which assume general equilibrium, perfect or near-to-perfect information 
and steady-state systems appear to be empirically invalid, and policy actions derived from them 
engender a great risk of unintended consequences. The underestimation of the relevance of cascade 
effects in financial markets, for instance, has prevented policymakers to act preemptively in 2008, thus 
contributing to the economic collapse that followed (Haldane and May, 2011). Other powerful 
criticisms of the current conceptual and methodological stance of economics are given by Shiller 
(2010), Krugman (2011), Stiglitz (2012), and Cristian, Dumitru-Alexandru and Daniel (2012), to name 
a few. 
 
This paper attempts to present a network-based approach to the modeling of financial crises and 
shocks, with great attention given to the issue of uncertainty and missing data. More specifically, it 
advances the augmentation of the DebtRank algorithm with uncertainty intervals, derived by the 
application of the fitness model to the reconstruction of financial networks. It is also demonstrated 
how this variant of DebtRank is superior to the standard default contagion algorithm through an 
experiment involving synthetic networks estimated from real data.  
The paper is structured into seven main chapters, introduction included. Chapter 2 introduces the 
research question – namely, how are financial systems affected by adverse events? – and provides the 
motivational and literature backgrounds to the research. After a brief account of the effects of financial 
crises onto the wider economy and society, relevant literature will be reviewed. Three strands will be 
critically discussed: indicator-based approaches to systemic risk, Dynamic Stochastic General 
Equilibrium (DSGE) models, and network analysis, to which the research contributes. Chapter 3 
presents the design of the model. It will explain how interbank systems are operationalised in the 
network paradigm, and will show the mathematical framework behind the main two modules of the 
model, respectively dealing with network reconstruction and financial shock contagion simulation.  
Subsequently, Chapter 4 implements the model in an experiment setting. The experiment will test the 
performance of the Debtrank and default contagion algorithms on three synthetic interbank network 
ensembles, demonstrating that the former is able to detect an increase in the systemic importance of a 
bank in a more sensitive way than the latter. The results of the experiment do not only contribute to 
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the advancement of knowledge on systemic financial risk, but also have deep policy implications, 
which are considered in Chapter 5.  This section will briefly present three possible applications of the 
framework. The first is aimed at the monitoring of systemic risk over time, the second at the stress-
testing of a financial institution at different conditions of distress, and the third at the evaluation of 
loss probability distributions referring to one or more financial institutions, conditional on 
distributions of shocks affecting one or more shocked banks. The latter instrument reveals to be 
particularly useful for the calculation of Values at Risk (VaR) estimates. Chapter 6 will briefly assess 
the limitations of the work. A timetable will show how the author plans to perform the subsequent 
research steps. Finally, concluding remarks will follow in Chapter 7. 
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2. Background 
 
Due to the last crisis, 371 commercial banks failed between 1/1/2008 and 1/7/2011 in the United 
States alone (FDIC, 2013). Yet, little is still known as to why the impact has been so great. Attention to 
the systemic level of financial institutions has increased only following these events (Catte et al., 
2010). Macroprudential policy – policy aimed at ensuring financial stability – has become a major topic 
of interest among policy makers and academics only then (Clement, 2010). The first part of this section 
presents and explicates the relevance of the research question of this work, while the second part 
reviews three main approaches that are tackling it.  
2.1 The research question and its importance 
 
The goal of this work is to explore and synthesise measures that are able to quantitatively assess the 
systemic importance of financial institutions in adverse scenarios. The research question, thus, is: how 
are financial systems affected by adverse events? Good answers to the question have the potential to 
contribute to the development of preemptive measures against financial crises. It follows that the main 
reason to pursue this work is the opportunity to limit the negative consequences of financial distresses 
onto the wider economy and society. 
 
Economic history seems to agree to the statement that financial crises are detrimental to society. 
Reviews by Reinhart and Rogoff (2008; 2009) show stylised facts about the effect of financial turmoil 
on GDP growth and unemployment. 
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Figure 2.1 Real GDP decline following a financial crisis, and duration of the decline in years. Source: Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) 
As shown in fig. 2.1, the two scholars record a persistent decline in real GDP for many countries 
affected by a financial crisis, with an average decline of 9.3% lasting 1.9 years. Although the 
consequences of the 2008 financial crisis and the consequent debt crisis are still hard to grasp, Rose 
and Spiegel (2009) report preliminary data, in line to the patterns found above.  
 
Country % Change GDP, 2008 % Change, Stock 
Market, 2009 
Iceland -4.7 -90.00 
Estonia -2.8 -63.00 
Latvia -4.6 -55.1 
Ireland -2.8 -7.8 
New Zealand -0.9 -37.4 
Italy -0.6 -49.5 
Denmark -0.9 -48.6 
Japan -0.5 -42.1 
 
Table 2.1 Change in GDP and average stock market values in selected countries. Source: Rose and Spiegel (2009) 
Indeed, financial crises impact the growth of societies, and any scholarly attempt that can help 
preventing them should be welcome. 
 
Further historical evidence is presented in fig. 2.2, which shows a correlation between the occurrence 
of financial crises and the rise in unemployment. While the causal process leading from a crisis to 
unemployment may be contextual (Fallon and Lucas, 2002), OCSE studies point out that the 2008 
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financial crisis functioned as a catalyst that further increased unemployment – especially youth 
unemployment in Southern European countries (Choudhry, Marelli, and Signorelli, 2010). 
 
 
Figure 2.2 Rise in unemployment following a financial crisis, and duration of the rise in years. Source: Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) 
It is worth noting that the relevance of the research is also highlighted by the lack of models and policy 
instruments that can provide insights to policymakers as to how adverse events spread. This will be 
made apparent by section 2.2. 
 
2.2 Three approaches to systemic risk 
 
The three strands of literature presented in this section attempt to yield policy instruments that can be 
used by the macroprudential policy maker. In doing so, they also attempt to answer the research 
question of this paper. Each line of contribution tries to face the problem using a different theoretical 
and methodological perspective. The first subsection focuses on the efforts coming from the regulators 
scholarship. They seek to understand how financial systems are affected by shocks using an indicator-
based approach. The second subsection introduces some of the latest contributions originating from 
the application of DSGE models on financial systemic risk. These constitute the main reply of 
neoclassical economics to the argument that it has not been able to properly explain and account for 
modern-era financial crises. The third and last subsection explores the results of applications of 
complex network analysis and network contagion models on financial systems. It shows how depicting 
financial actors as components of a graph connected through interrelations can provide the most 
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valuable insights onto how financial systems are affected by shocks. Each subsection also analyses 
their major flaws or weaknesses1. 
 
Literature strand Key research works Strengths Weaknesses 
Indicator-based 
approaches 
BCBS (2011) 
BCBS (2013) 
Masciantonio (2013) 
 Easily 
implemented; 
 Data availability 
 Weighting is arbitrary; 
 Disregard of systemic 
interrelations. 
DSGE modeling Tovar (2009) 
De Walque, Pierrand 
and Rouabah (2010) 
Gerali et al. (2010) 
 Extensions of 
models already 
used by policy 
institutions; 
 Integration with 
the simulations of 
the wider 
economic system 
 Assumption of general 
equilibrium; 
 Very small number of 
agents simulated; 
 Very small number of 
time-steps considered. 
Complex network 
analysis 
Eisenberg and Noe 
(2001) 
Battiston et al. (2012) 
Roukny et al. (2013) 
 Recognition of 
systemic 
interrelations; 
 Capacity to 
quantify systemic 
effects of shocks 
and model their 
propagation 
 Poor data availability;  
 No uncertainty 
measures. 
 
Table 2.2 Strengths and weaknesses of the literature considered 
 
2.2.1 Indicator-based approaches 
 
Financial policy makers generally opt for frameworks that can be easily and robustly implemented, 
which require only public or readily accessible data, and are computable by non-scientific software 
(Adolfson et al., 2005). Because of such constraints model-based approaches are often not widely 
popular in several central banks and other regulatory bodies dealing with systemic risk.  
A number of institutions confronted the issue by developing indicator-based approaches. The most 
relevant attempt is the one presented by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS), which 
identifies systemically important financial institutions (BCBS, 2011). The question of how an adverse 
event affects the whole financial system is then answered by stating the extent to which the institution 
hit by the initial shock is systemically important. The more it is, the more severe will be the threat to 
the whole system.  
As mentioned in the introduction of this section, this line of literature has little explicit groundings on 
economic and financial theory; it is instead developed through several rounds of consultations with 
policy experts and empirical trials and evaluations2 (FSB, 2009). 
                                                          
1
 Due to space constraints, the chapter does not, by any means, aspire to provide a truly comprehensive review of the 
relevant literature; it only seeks to guide through the essential scholarly work needed to contextualise the research. 
For more exhaustive accounts, see Galati and Moessner (2013). 
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Category (weighting) Individual indicator Indicator weighting 
Cross-jurisdictional activity 
(20%) 
Cross-jurisdictional claims 10% 
Cross-jurisdictional liabilities 10% 
Size (20%) 
Total exposures as defined for 
use in the 
Basel III leverage ratio 
20% 
Interconnectedness (20%) 
Intra-financial system assets 6.67% 
Intra-financial system liabilities 6.67% 
Wholesale funding ratio 6.67% 
Substitutability (20%) 
Assets under custody 6.67% 
Payments cleared and settled 
through 
payment systems 
6.67% 
Values of underwritten 
transactions in 
debt and equity markets 
6.67% 
Complexity (20%) 
OTC derivatives notional value 6.67% 
Level 3 assets 6.67% 
Trading book value and 
Available for Sale 
value 
6.67% 
 
Table 2. 2 Indicator-based measurement approach to identify systemically important financial institutions. Source: BCBS (2011) 
The Basel Committee’s indicator conglomerates five distinct sets of categories, each arithmetically 
contributing to its value equally. They are, namely, cross-jurisdictional activity, size, 
interconnectedness, substitutability, complexity. As shown in table 2.3, most of the categories feature 
two or three operationalising measures.  
Cross-jurisdictional activity indicates the importance of banks’ activities outside of their home 
territories (Weistroffer and Speyer, 2011). A bank is deemed to be more systemically important if its 
activities are distributed across the globe. Size is another factor that, intuitively, might affect the 
importance of a bank. If a bank possesses high levels of total exposure, it is more likely to generate 
widespread distress in financial and economic systems. Interconnectedness relates to how a financial 
institution interacts with the rest of the system. According to the Basel Committee, the more an 
institution is connected to others, the higher is its systemic impact in case of failure or distress. 
Substitutability refers to how easily services of a financial institution can be replaced with another’s. It 
is likely that the failure of a less substitutable bank would affect the health of the system more heavily. 
A negative correlation, thus, between substitutability and systemic importance exists. Finally, 
complexity regards the intricacy and ramifications of a bank’s organisational structure and operations. 
Higher complexity would mean that the resolution of a default bank incurs in higher costs and 
negative externalities.  
                                                                                                                                                                                                
2
 Admittedly, the judgment of the policy experts that participated to the construction of the indicator is informed by 
theory, but a clear theoretical is neither declared nor discernible in technical documents (BCBS, 2011, 2013).  
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BCBS (2011) is not the sole body advancing indicator-based approaches to systemic risk. In fact, a 
number of studies followed its example to derive alternative indicators. All of them, nonetheless, tend 
to maintain the same categories of analysis, challenging only their operationalisations and proposing 
alternative sources of data or different calculation methods. A recent instance is Masciantonio (2013), 
which adapts BCBS’ methodology such that only publicly available data is needed to construct the 
index. A further example is Braemer and Gischer (2011), which, in a similar way, proposes an 
indicator-based measurement of systemic banks and their impact that adopts only already-existing 
indices for each category. The approach has also been used to identify systemically important US non-
banks financial institutions (FSOC, 2011) and insurance companies (IAIS, 2013).  
 
Indicator-based measurements feature at least two critical shortcomings, respectively being 
methodological and conceptual in nature. These, arguably, prevent this stream of literature to properly 
answer the research question, thereby leaving room for novel, better approaches. 
The first weakness is the underlying assumption that every category characterising the systemic 
importance of a financial institution is equally relevant. Even presuming that each of them is actually 
relevant, there is absolutely no a priori reason to justify equal weights. This only apparently naïve 
methodological decision is most probably dictated by the current uncertainty that still pervades the 
causal processes behind systemic risk and failures (Schwarcz, 2008). Some studies – such as Stern and 
Feldman (2004), Zhou (2010), Hart and Zingales (2011) – point towards the significance of financial 
institutions’ size and complexity, whereas others – such as Drehman and Tarashev (2011), Dungey et 
al. (2012) – to their interconnectedness and international presence. To the knowledge of the author, 
currently no study or sensitivity test has been specifically designed to shed light on what indicators’ 
categories contribute the most to the systemic stability of the financial system, and in what conditions. 
Nonetheless, this does not justify the choice of equally weighting the factors. Such a methodology can 
lead to biases in the estimation of the impact of shocks to the system, thereby causing erroneous policy 
decisions and detrimental consequences for the economy.  
The second weakness relates to the conceptual implicit assumption that indicator-based approaches 
make: knowing the systemic importance of single financial institutions is enough to understand how a 
shock affects the whole financial system (BCBS, 2011). That is dangerously wrong. For instance, the 
failure of Northern Rock – a very systemically important bank – in late 2007 did not allow 
policymakers to assess the subsequent systemic consequences (Goldman-Pinkham and Yorulmazer, 
2010). Even assuming that indicator-based approaches correctly identify the relevance of a bank, 
there is not enough information to comprehend how the shock propagates through other institutions, 
as it is not known how they are linked to each other (Minoiu and Reyes, 2009). That is why a network-
based approach could be more suitable to the problem. 
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2.2.2 Dynamic stochastic general equilibrium models 
 
Dynamic stochastic general equilibrium models (DSGE) are increasingly used tools in economic and 
monetary policy making (Tovar, 2009). They are able to simulate the main actors of an economy – 
households, firms, governments – and their interactions by the computation of differential equations 
and utility functions which, according to neoclassical or neo-Keynesian economic theories, describe 
their behaviour (Sbordone et al., 2010). Because DSGE models allegedly have the faculty to capture – 
in a stylised way – the dynamics of an economy in its entirety, several central banks developed their 
own variants. Examples are the Bank of England (Harrison et al., 2005), the Bank of Canada (Moran, 
1996) and the Central Bank of Chile (Chumacero and Hebbel, 2004).  
Usually, DSGE models do not include financial institutions in their set of actors. If they do, they are 
assumed to be perfectly identical and frictionless, acting merely as intermediaries in the flow of money 
among all other economic agents (Tovar, 2009). This is certainly questionable, given the not-so-
irrelevant frequency of economic shocks sparkled within the financial realm, such as the 1980-90s 
Japanese crisis, the 1980s Latin American crisis, the 1997 Asian crises, the dot-com bubble and the 
recent 2008 sub-prime crisis (Kindleberger and Aliber 2011).  
 
Motivated by the gap in the literature, some scholars embarked onto the construction of novel DSGE 
models which would account for more sophisticated financial markets, thereby being able to 
understand how a financial system is impacted by shocks. Probably, the most representative instance 
of this line of research is De Walque, Pierrand and Rouabah (2010). The trio devises a DSGE model 
with a heterogeneous banking sector, that is, with banks whose portfolios and profit maximising 
behaviours are not identical. They also introduce endogenous default probabilities for both firms and 
banks, and allow for the simulation of banking regulations and liquidity injections in the interbank 
market. Such novelties permit the observation of the impact of external or internal shocks in the 
financial sectors, and would even enhance policy making through the experimentation of anti-systemic 
risk practices in the model. An analogous scholarly effort has been produced by Gerali et al. (2010). 
The paper introduces a DSGE model with financial frictions and with imperfectly competitive financial 
markets. The assumption of banking being in a market regime of perfect competition is relaxed, 
allowing for the existence monopolistic structures, as empirical studies suggest (De Bondt, 2005; 
Sorensen and Werner, 2006). Theoretically, such a feature is instrumental to simulate realistic shocks 
dynamics, as the size and market concentration of financial institution may well affect the health of the 
overall system.  
 
A DSGE approach to systemic risk model has severe limitations in assessing the systemic effects of 
shocks in finance. Two of them are explored in this paragraph.  
DSGE models equations are deeply rooted in neoclassical and, more recently, neo-Keynesian theories 
(Wickens, 2012). That means that any bias that affects such theories is also reflected in the 
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computational models. The most critical assumption is that of general equilibrium: it is granted that 
there exists a steady state for the economy, towards which it tends to converge over time (Starr, 
2011). The assumption is regarded as unrealistic. Closer empirical inspection suggests that economic 
and social processes are dynamic and in a state of evolvable change and multiple equilibria 
(Beinhocker, 2007; Hodgson and Knudsen, 2010). In fact, what characterises economies is its ever-
changing face, e.g. new industries arising and others declining, changes in labour demands due to 
innovation (Arthur, 2006). 
The practical implication of the general equilibrium assumption is an underestimation of the 
propagation of shocks within the system. Simulated shocks make the system diverge from the steady 
state, whereas the equations dictating the behaviour of financial actors will act in such a way as to let 
the system return it (Colander et al., 2009). This negative feedback is likely to reduce or nullify the 
positive feedback of the shock, acting as a bias.  
The second weakness relates to the over-simplicity featured in DSGE models. The one in De Walque, 
Pierrand and Rouabah (2010) counts only two firms and two banks. Also Gerali’s et al. (2010) model 
simulates only a very small number of financial institutions. As for February 2014, there are 157 banks 
incorporated in the UK alone (BoE, 2014). Without a realistic number of financial actors, it is not 
possible to obtain informed accounts on how shocks affect the financial system. The main reason is 
that with higher number of market participants the shock dynamics may substantially change 
qualitatively, a phenomenon known as emergence (Standish, 2001; Gregersen, 2002). The 2008 
financial crisis came to being through the non-trivial interaction of hundreds of actors, not simply a 
handful (Taylor, 2009). 
 
2.2.3 Network analysis 
 
The shortcomings of the two approaches explored above are mainly due to the disregard of the 
complexity of financial systems. Both lines of contributions experienced a discrete success in policy 
making because of the easiness in their elaborations and the compatibility with already-existing policy 
instruments – at the cost of gravely compromising the ability to understand the dynamics of credit 
crises. The costs far outweigh the benefits, and an alternative, more empirically-valid and elaborate 
approach is needed. Complex network analysis, arguably, is the good candidate. 
 
As Haldane and May (2011) recognised, the interaction of financial actors gives rise to patterns of 
complex interactions and nonlinear dependencies, analogous to the ones found in natural and social 
ecosystems. This allows the application of complex systems analytical methods to the problem of 
study, with particular reference to the analysis of complex networks (Waldrop, 1992; Bogg and Geyer, 
2007). 
Network analysis is the study of the topology, structure and dynamics of systems whose component’s 
relations can be mapped onto node-link graphs (Wasserman, 1994). Some early studies showed the 
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importance of interbank relations with regards to systemic risk. Allen and Gale (2000) provided the 
theoretical foundations of how shocks can spread through a network of financial institutions, whereas 
Freixas and Parigi (1998), Eisenberg and Noe (1999) devised the very first financial shock contagion 
models, whose algorithm is introduced in Chapter 3. The latter work inspired the empirical application 
of network analysis in financial systems. Examples are Upper and Worms (2004) for the German 
financial market, and Boss and Helsinger (2004) for the Austrian one.  
The lack of appropriate data slowed down the advancement of this line of research. Information about 
interbank linkages, such as short and long-term lending and portfolio commonalities, is often lacking 
(Upper, 2007).  In the last few years, though, scholars have produced seminal work with the potential 
of properly answering the research question, thanks to new data gathered by central banks and the 
appearance of novel statistical methods to treat partial information (Servedio, Caldarelli and Butta, 
2004).  
 
Two research papers are of key interest. The first is Battiston et al. (2012), which develops a new 
measure of systemic risk known as DebtRank. DebtRank is a recursive algorithm that is able to provide 
estimates of the total systemic loss caused by the failure or distress of one or more banks. In other 
words, it simulates how a market shock would spread across financial institutions, quantifying the 
final damage of the cascade effect. The authors apply the instrument to the network of FED emergency 
loans (comprising a large number of international banks), and identify what banks – according to 
available data – would cause the most adverse effects on the whole network.  
The second research has been produced by Roukny et al. (2013), who explore the stability of different 
network topologies against default cascades. More specifically, the authors simulate default cascade 
dynamics in banking networks under several market conditions, such as market illiquidity and sudden 
capital ratios changes. The topologies of the simulated networks are scale-free or random. Their 
results show that no architecture can always be preferred to another, yet their methodology provides 
a valuable starting point to assess how market shocks propagate among financial networks. Similar 
conclusions are found in Huang et al. (2013), who simulate default cascades caused by market price 
shocks. 
 
Also these works are not immune from complications, which give rise to gaps that the research intends 
to fill. The most critical of which is still the poor availability of interbank data. Battiston et al. (2012) 
relies on a chunky dataset, where only partial data is available and most probably not representing the 
totality of the interbank financial network. In a similar vein, other empirical studies such as Iori et al. 
(2008) make use of data referring to overnight or short-term lending in national markets. This 
approach may not allow inferences to be valid on the populations of interest, such as networks of 
international banks and networks of longer-term financial relationships. Ultimately, the risk of missing 
crucial mechanisms of how shocks propagate is nontrivial. For this very reason, it is needed a method 
that would allow researchers to reconstruct networks from incomplete data, and would couple it with 
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a financial contagion model. This strategy would also permit the integration of uncertainty measures 
into the investigation of systemic risk. Chapter 3 will discuss this very point, among other things.  
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3. The model: methodology and design 
 
The model described in this section attempts to quantitatively understand how financial systems are 
affected by adverse events, provided that incomplete data is available with regards to how banks 
dynamically affect each other. It does so by simulating shocks on an ensemble of financial networks 
reconstructed from partial real information3. The Debtrank and default cascade algorithms are used 
(and their performance compared) to quantify the severity of the shocks caused by each bank in 
distress. Uncertainty about the actual impact of the shock is highlighted by the use of confidence 
intervals for the resulting output of the algorithms. The next subsection will describe the key concepts 
of the model, together with their operationalisations. Subsections 3.2 and 3.3 will outline the contents 
of the main two modules of the model, respectively dealing with networks estimation and contagion 
simulation.  
 
3.1 Concepts and operationalisation 
 
As summarised in table 3.1 below, the research makes use of four key concepts derived from network 
science and finance. 
 
Concept Operationalisation 
Network Interbank market network 
Nodes 227 largest (by total asset value) EU15 financial 
institutions indexed in stock markets 
Node attributes Financial institutions’ total assets, market 
capitalisation, total interbank assets, total interbank 
liabilities 
Edges Financial institutions’ exposure to each other 
 
Table 3.1 Concepts and respective operationalisations 
Of utmost importance is to define the concept of network, nodes, and edges. A network (or graph) is a 
collection of entities, known as nodes, and a collection of relationships between nodes, known as edges 
or links (Wasserman, 1994). Analytically, a network can be simply represented as a set containing all 
nodes and edges:  
 
G = {𝑁, 𝐸} 
 
𝑁 = {𝑛1, 𝑛2, … , 𝑛𝑔} 
 
𝐸 = {𝑒1, 𝑒2, … , 𝑒𝑘} 
 
Equation 3.1 Analytical representation of a network 
 
                                                          
3
 Despite the use of real world input data, the inferences of the model cannot by any means be considered of 
empirical value. The data is simply used in order to construct networks with realistic topologies.   
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Where 𝑛𝑔 is a single node in the network, and 𝑒𝑘 is an edge between two nodes. An alternative way is 
to represent a network using an adjacency square matrix, with dimensions equal to the total number 
of nodes in the network. At the intersections between the rows and columns of the adjacency matrix 
edge values are reported. 
 
Each node can store attributes, qualitative or quantitative properties that provide specific information 
about the nature of the nodes (Brandes and Wagner, 2004). Edges can be undirected or directed. If 
directed, the kind of relationship represented is asymmetric. Furthermore, edges can also be weighted 
with a value explicating the intensity of the relationship (Palla et al., 2007). This research is focused on 
directed weighted edges, which can be analytically represented by a simple vector containing the 
source node, the end node, and the value of the weight:  
 
𝑒𝑘⃗⃗⃗⃗ = < 𝑛𝑖, 𝑛𝑗, 𝑤 > 
 
Equation 3.2 Analytical representation of a directed weighted edge 
In this model, a network represents a collection of synthetic interbank lending snapshots of financial 
institutions estimated for the 227 financial institutions with largest total asset value, located in the 
EU154 and indexed in a stock market. Each snapshot would refer to the synthetic market exchanges 
registered over a month. More specifically:  
 
(i) Nodes constitute financial institutions classified as commercial and investment banks, that 
is, focused on household lending or on the provision of capital to large business projects 
and securities (Haberman, 1987). Each node is characterised by four scalar attributes: its 
market capitalisation, representing the robustness of the bank (Ediz et al., 1998), its total 
asset value; and the value of their total interbank assets and liabilities. The data is 
extracted from the database Bankscope. It refers to the end of the fiscal year 2007, and is 
used to estimate the synthetic networks adopted in the experiment. By doing so, it is 
assured that the synthetic network topologies and dynamics approach those of real 
financial networks. Subsection 3.2 better elaborates this point. As shown in fig. 3.1, the 
frequency distributions of the data clearly show power law features, in which few actors in 
the system have values of order of magnitude greater than the majority of all other actors.   
 
                                                          
4
 Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, 
Spain, Sweden and United Kingdom. 
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Figure 3.1 Frequency distribution of banking data 
(ii) Interbank connections are operationalised by the amount of not yet claimed lending 
between financial institutions over a pre-determined period of time. The lending 
represents a directed edge from the borrower to the lender, with weight equal to the 
amount borrowed. Such quantities are calculated using the algorithm described in the 
following paragraphs.  
 
3.2 The network estimation module 
 
The network estimation module is based on the fitness bootstrapping method presented in Musmeci et 
al. (2013). As in De Masi, Iori and Caldarelli (2006), the method assumes that the probability of any 
two nodes being linked is proportional to a latent scalar value, named the fitness of the node. 
Analytically:  
 
𝑝𝑖𝑗 =
𝑥𝑖𝑥𝑗
1 + 𝑥𝑖𝑥𝑗 
 
 
Equation 3.3 Probability of the existence of an edge between node i and j as a function of their fitness 
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Where 𝑝𝑖𝑗  is the probability of nodes i and j being linked, and 𝑥𝑖 and 𝑥𝑗 their respective fitness values. 
Because x is latent, it is assumed the existence of an observable proxy of the fitness value, y, evaluated 
from x though an unknown universal parameter z: 
 
√𝑧𝑦𝑖 = 𝑥𝑖 
 
Equation 3.4 Relation between the latent fitness and its proxy 
 
Therefore, eq. 3.3 becomes:  
 
𝑝𝑖𝑗 =
𝑧𝑦𝑖𝑦𝑗
1 + 𝑧𝑦𝑖𝑦𝑗 
 
 
Equation 3.5 Probability of the existence of an edge between node i and j as a function of their fitness proxy values 
Eq. 3.5 can be used to estimate a network given the knowledge of only some or of none of the edges, i.e. 
of a sub-network. This is possible through the estimation of z in the following equality:  
 
∑𝑘𝑖  ≡  ∑∑𝑝𝑖𝑗
𝑗 ≠𝑖𝑖
 
𝑖
 
 
Equation 3.6 The relationship between the sub-network sum of degrees and the sum of edge probabilities 
Where 𝑘𝑖 is the degree of each node in the sub-network – i.e. the number of edges it possesses. In the 
case of a total lack of knowledge of a sub-network, ∑ 𝑘𝑖  𝑖 can be substituted with a pre-determined 
amount of total links. Once z is found, it is possible to estimate the edge probabilities for each pair of 
nodes, and estimate a network ensemble.  
In financial networks, it has been demonstrated that the value of total assets of a bank performs well 
as a fitness proxy variable. Musmeci et al. (2013) have found that, given the availability of total asset 
information for each bank and information about 7% of the edges, it is possible to reconstruct an 
entire network with same topology and a 7-10% margin of error, meaning that around a tenth of the 
estimated edges or non-edges do not coincide with the real network. The module follows this best 
practice in order to obtain realistic networks with pre-specified densities.  
 
Once estimated the networks’ topologies, the weight of each edge are to be estimated. This is not a 
trivial problem, as the weight between any two nodes must not be greater that the source node’s total 
interbank asset and the end node’s total interbank liabilities. Analytically, each weight has two 
constraints: 
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0 < 𝑤𝑖𝑗 < ∑𝐴𝑖
𝐼𝐵
𝑖
 
 
0 < 𝑤𝑖𝑗 < ∑𝐿𝑖
𝐼𝐵
𝑗
 
 
Equation 3.7 Constraints for network weights 
The problem is here solved with the heuristic explicated in fig. 3.2. The algorithm cycles through each 
node i in the network, allowing it to lend a small portion5 of its total interbank assets to its successor 
nodes, say j. The iteration on a lender node stops when the total amount lent reaches ∑ 𝐴𝑖
𝐼𝐵
𝑖 , while the 
iteration on a borrower node ends when ∑ 𝐿𝑖
𝐼𝐵
𝑗  is reached. In order to diminish computing time, the 
algorithm globally stops when the entire networks has been iterated 500 times6.  
 
                                                          
5
 The amount lent at each iteration is 0.01 mil USD. 
6
 The algorithm allows constraints to be respected, but the total sum of the resulting weights will not obviously equal 
the real-world interbank liabilities and assets value. This is due to the fact that real financial institutions have 
interbank exposures to institutions not included in this model.  
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Figure 3.2 Flowchart of the algorithm assigning weights to the estimated links 
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The final flow of the module is presented in fig. 3.3. For each snapshot desired in the experiment, an 
ensemble containing 50 networks is estimated. This, as it will be shown in Chapter 4, will allow the 
evaluation of uncertainty intervals in the experiment.  
 
 
Figure 3.3 Flowchart of the network estimation module 
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3.3 The contagion module 
 
The contagion module adopts DebtRank and the default contagion algorithm (Battiston et al., 2012) in 
order to model the impact of financial shocks in the networks reconstructed through the previous 
module. Both algorithms are recursive methods suggested to determine the systemic relevance of 
nodes in financial networks. They measure the fraction of the total economic value in the network that 
is potentially affected by one or more nodes (Thurner and Poledna, 2013). Analytically, they work as a 
dynamic epidemiological process.  
 
Two inputs are needed by DebtRank. The first is 𝑊, the impact matrix, with same dimensions as the 
network’s adjacency matrix. In this work, each element of W is evaluated by dividing the liabilities of 
the borrower by the market capitalisation of the lender:  
 
𝑊𝑖𝑗 = 𝑚𝑖𝑛[1,
𝐿𝑖𝑗
𝐶𝑗
] 
 
Equation 3.8 Impact of node j (the borrower) to node i (the lender) 
 
Where 𝐿𝑖𝑗 is the amount borrowed by i from j, and 𝐶𝑗 is j’s capitalisation. This measure provides an 
indicator of the vulnerability of a lender with respect to the borrower. If, for instance, the lender’s 
exposure to a borrower has value 0.2, it implies that the lender would lose an amount of assets equal 
to 20% of the value of its capital if the borrower failed. This would put the lender in distress, but it 
would not cause it to default, as there is still capital that can cope with the loss. 
 
The second input is a vector indicating the initial shocks to be simulated, 𝜓. 𝜓 has the same length as 
the total number of nodes in the networks; each element can take a value between 0 and 1, where 0 
means no shock and 1 implies the default of the bank.  
 
Once the inputs are initialised, two state variables are assigned to each node in the network: a 
continuous variable ℎ𝑖 ∈ [0,1], and a discrete variable 𝑠𝑖  ∈ {𝑈, 𝐷, 𝐼}. At time 1, their state is:  
 
ℎ𝑖(1) = 𝜓𝑛, ∀𝑖 ∈  𝑆𝑓 
ℎ𝑖(1) = 𝜓0, ∀𝑖 ∉  𝑆𝑓 
𝑠𝑖(1) = 𝐷,            ∀𝑖 ∈  𝑆𝑓 
𝑠𝑖(1) = 𝑈,            ∀𝑖 ∉  𝑆𝑓 
 
Equation 3.9 Initial conditions for state variable h and s 
Where 𝑆𝑓 is the set of nodes in distress at time 1, and 𝜓𝑛 and 𝜓0 are respectively non-zero and zero 
values in  . The contagion dynamics is described by eq. 3.10 and 3.11: 
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ℎ𝑖(𝑡) = 𝑚𝑖𝑛 [1, ℎ𝑖(𝑡 − 1) + ∑ 𝑊𝑗𝑖ℎ𝑗(𝑡 − 1)
𝑗|𝑠𝑗(𝑡−1)=𝐷
] 
 
Equation 3.10 Dynamics of variable h for DebtRank 
𝑠𝑖(𝑡) =  {
𝐷     𝑖𝑓 ℎ𝑖(𝑡) > 0, 𝑠𝑖(𝑡 − 1) ≠ 𝐼 
𝐼                        𝑖𝑓 𝑠𝑖(𝑡 − 1) = 𝐷
𝑠𝑖(𝑡 − 1)                    𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒
 
Equation 3.11 Dynamics of variable s 
Finally, the impact R of nodes in set 𝑆𝑓 is simply the difference between the total impact at the end of 
the cascade at time T and the initial shock, multiplied by the nodes’ economic value v. In this 
application v is represented by the banks’ market capitalisation values: 
 
𝑅 = ∑ ℎ𝑖(𝑇)𝑣𝑖 − ∑ ℎ𝑖(1)
𝑖𝑖
𝑣𝑖  
 
Equation 3.12 Evaluation of the systemic impact 
As specified in eq. 3.11, the impact can have currency value.  If DebtRank is evaluated for each financial 
institution (for instance, by simulating the default of each), the resulting 𝑅𝑠 can be normalised so as to 
obtain a ranking of their systemic importance. 
 
The default cascade algorithm can be described by the same mathematics outlined above, with two 
crucial differences. First, the shock values in  𝜓 can only be ones (as it only simulates complete 
defaults); second, the shock propagates if and only if an affected node collapses. Eq. 3.13 changes 
accordingly:  
 
𝑠𝑖(𝑡) =  {
𝐷     𝑖𝑓 ℎ𝑖(𝑡) > 1, 𝑠𝑖(𝑡 − 1) ≠ 𝐼 
𝐼                        𝑖𝑓 𝑠𝑖(𝑡 − 1) = 𝐷
𝑠𝑖(𝑡 − 1)                    𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒
 
 
Equation 3.13 Dynamics of variable s the default cascade 
Clearly, there are limitations to this approach, which become evident thanks to the results of the 
experiment. Fig. 3.4 summarises the flow of the contagion module as it will be run in the experiment. 
Because several time snapshots with synthetic networks are evaluated, the module cycles through 
them.  
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Figure 3.4 Flowchart of the contagion module 
 
27 
 
4. The model: Implementation and results 
 
This research contends that more light can be shed to the question of how financial systems are 
affected by adverse events by the use of the DebtRank algorithm, augmented with uncertainty 
intervals. The synthetic experiment of this section aims at testing its performance against another 
measure based on the complex networks analytic framework, namely the default contagion algorithm. 
More specifically, it tests hypothesis H0:  
 
H0: The Debtrank algorithm is able to capture losses due to adverse events in an interbank network 
sooner than the default contagion algorithm.  
 
In the experiment, losses are measured as the fraction of the total market capitalisation of the network 
that is lost after the shock. Shocks are the failure of one of the financial institutions. By ‘sooner’, 
instead, it is meant the capacity of identifying systemic losses in a balance sheet setting where the 
other algorithm still can’t.  
 
This chapter is divided into two sections. The first will present the experiment setting, and the three 
synthetic network ensembles on which the hypothesis is tested. The second will demonstrate the 
result of the analysis and conclude that DebtRank indeed outperforms the default contagion algorithm 
in the task of identifying systemic losses.  
 
4.1 Network ensembles and experiment settings 
 
By the use of the first module of the model, three network ensembles are reconstructed from the real-
world data shown in the previous chapter. Each ensemble consists of 50 networks, enough to build 
confidence interval of the systemic losses estimates. Such network ensembles possess identical node 
attributes (that is, balance sheet data), but will differ in density distribution, in order to allow the 
testing of the financial contagion algorithms at different topological settings.  More specifically, each 
ensemble respectively features about 1500, 3000, and 5000 edges. Summary statistics are shown in 
table 4.1 below.  
 
∑𝒌 Mean St. Dev.  Min  Max 
1500 1502.20 28.85 1445 1568 
3000 3003.10 35.06 2939 3102 
5000 4995.90 37.25 4912 5073 
 
Table 4.1 Summary statistics of the density distributions for the three ensembles used in the experiment 
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Figure 4.1 Frequency distributions of the density in each ensemble 
The distribution of the total sum of links for each ensemble is displayed in fig. 4.1 above. The module 
estimates collection of networks with densities that oscillate around the inputted ∑𝑘 in eq. 3.6. 
Although it cannot be stated conclusively because of the relatively small number of networks in each 
sample, it is likely that the asymptotic form of the frequency distributions above is normal. Further 
investigation will have to ascertain the contention7.  
Because of the stochastic nature of the estimation method, several possible link configurations for 
each node are explored. This engenders the possibility to evaluate a distribution of the impact of the 
systemic loss caused by a node, as calculated by the two algorithms. This very opportunity enables the 
construction of the confidence intervals which will be seen in the next section. The node-degree 
distributions of the networks resemble the ones shown in fig. 4.2. As the density increases, the power 
law form of the distributions appear to flatten out.  
                                                          
7
 The statistical properties of this network estimation method have not yet been explored, to the knowledge of the 
author.  
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Figure 4.2 Node-Degree distribution in example network for each ensemble 
 
The experiment tests the performance of the contagion algorithms by building an artificial time series 
of network snapshots with gradually worse systemic conditions, which will render each of the banks in 
the network extremely systematically important. In other words, by the end of the time series, the 
failure of each bank would cause almost the entire financial network to collapse. Operationally, this 
can be done in two ways: by gradually increasing the amount of interbank lending, or by gradually 
decreasing the market capitalisation of the banks. In both case the relative dependency on each bank 
to another increases, thereby causing greater distress in case of a shock. In this experiment, it has been 
decided to opt for the latter method. Ten time steps are constructed. At each step, the market 
capitalisation of each bank becomes on third of what the value was in the previous step. Analytically:  
 
𝐶𝑡
𝑖 =  0.3 ∗ 𝐶𝑡−1
𝑖 ,     𝑡 = 0,… ,10 
 
Equation 4.1 Changes in market capitalisation at each time step 
Where 𝐶𝑡
𝑖  is the market capitalisation of node i at time step t. Apart from the change in capitalisation, 
all conditions remain the same. The networks at the each time step feature same topologies and 
balance sheet attributes.  
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The experiment works as follows. For each time step, each node is assumed to fail (i.e. each bank to 
collapse), and the proportion of the losses of the system caused by the failure are evaluated with both 
DebtRank and the default contagion algorithm. The losses shown are the arithmetic average across the 
ensemble, with maximum and minimum variables being respectively the upper and lower uncertainty 
bounds. Because of space constraints, the outputs of the experiment are shown only with regards to 
the first five largest nodes by total asset value8.   
 
4.2 Results 
 
Figures 4.3, 4.4 and 4.5 respectively show values of DebtRank (left columns) and default contagion 
(right columns) for the three ensembles. The horizontal axes are time steps, while the vertical ones 
represent the proportion of total market capitalisation in the system which has been burnt as a 
consequence of the failure of the bank. It is evident that DebtRank is able to capture the increasing 
systemic importance of the collapsed banks in a more continuous and sensible way than the default 
contagion algorithm. H0, therefore, is not rejected. From a deeper scrutiny of the results, the following 
observations can be made:  
 
(i) Both algorithms converge at the final time steps, when the financial institution is already 
capable of letting almost the network collapse. This shows the value of the default 
contagion method in capturing the systemic importance of a bank and, therefore, the 
fragility of the system with respect to it. Nevertheless, it does it too late, when the losses 
are already at great magnitudes. 
 
(ii) When the default contagion algorithm still registers zero systemic impact, DebtRank 
features increasingly steeper values, thereby acting as an early warning signal of the later 
total collapse. It is possible to note increasing nonzero values of the impact at time step 4 
for all nodes, for instance.  
 
(iii) By increasing the density of the networks in the ensemble, on average the impact of the 
shocks becomes slightly greater. Surely, a greater variation in density is needed to inspect 
further this observation, yet it can already be noticed that an increase in the interbank 
exposures is able to augment the rate at which impact cascades occur.  
 
(iv) The uncertainty intervals of the default cascade algorithm are extremely large, while the 
ones of DebtRank are narrower, with a convergence towards the final time steps. This 
suggests a greater ability of this variant of DebtRank to capture the systemic importance of 
                                                          
8
 The entire dataset with the results, though, is available for inspection.  
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a bank despite the lack of knowledge of its exact links configuration, a property that is 
extremely valuable in a context where the lack of fine-grained data is persistent.  
 
 
Figure 4.3 Evolution of Debtrank and default contagion for the five largest banks for the ensemble with ∑𝒌 = 1500 
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Figure 4.4 Evolution of Debtrank and default contagion for the five largest banks for the ensemble with ∑𝒌 = 3000 
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Figure 4.5 Evolution of Debtrank and default contagion for the five largest banks for the ensemble with ∑𝒌 = 5000 
 
Point (iv) becomes more apparent by analyising how the qualitative properties of the distribution of 
the impacts estimated by the algorithms changes over time. As a demonstration, figures 4.6 and 4.7 
show the variation of this quantity for node 1 in the third ensemble. The default contagion algorithm 
features zero of extremely minute values until time step 6, after which it starts to have a quasi-binary 
distribution. Only at the final two time steps it generates a more continuous range of values. The same 
does not hold for DebtRank, which at every time step exhibits a continuous distribution of variables, 
making the construction of the uncertainty intervals a more meaningful exercise.   
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Figure 4.6 Frequency distribution of the impact evaluated by the default contagion algorithm for node 1 in the third ensemble 
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Figure 4.7 Frequency distribution of the impact evaluated by DebtRank for node 1 in the third ensemble 
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5. Policy implications 
 
The experiment in Chapter 4 has shown that DebtRank augmented with uncertainty intervals is a 
suitable candidate for the investigation of how financial systems are affected by adverse events, 
resulting superior to an alternative financial shock contagion algorithm. The implications of this 
conclusion are extremely relevant for macroprudential policy making. Indeed, the model can yield a 
number of instruments that would allow the regulators to assess attentively the conditions of a 
banking system. Four of such instruments are briefly mentioned in these paragraphs.  
 
The first module alone may already represent an extremely valuable tool. Because of the persistent 
lack of complete data in this area, a method to reconstruct financial networks can be implemented in 
many empirical cases. The Bank of England, for instance, features interbank data related to UK-located 
banks, but not to others headquartered in other countries. This very missing part of the network will 
be estimated during the empirical validation of the work presented in this work, as shown by the next 
Chapter. It must also be noted that this part of the model is already in use at the Central Bank of 
Canada. This only but emphasises the argument made here.  
 
Certainly, the model of this work can also be used to dynamically assess the potential systemic impact 
of banks over time. In the same fashion of the synthetic experiment, it is possible to reconstruct 
ensemble of networks and evaluate DebtRank at each quarter, for instance. This would allow the 
identification of early warning signals, thereby suggesting policy makers what institutions would need 
closer attention or immediate preemptive action.  
 
A third policy instrument would involve the stress-testing of a financial institution under different 
shock conditions. Because DebtRank does not necessarily require shocks engendering the complete 
failure of a bank, it is possible to investigate other conditions of distress. An example is provided in fig. 
5.1 below. In this exercise, node 1 of the ensemble with an average of 3000 edges is stress-tested 
under 20 scenarios at time step 9. At each scenario the shock to be withstood by the bank increases 
gradually from 0.1 (implying a loss in the value of total assets by 10%) to 1 (total loss of value and, 
therefore, default). Green and red lines are respectively upper and lower bounds of the impact, while 
the blue line is the average. This kind of exercise can be replicated by using different distribution of 
shock value, and on one or more banks altogether.  
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Figure 5.1 Stress-testing of node 1 at different shock scenarios 
A further and, possibly, more interesting policy application involves the quantification of the losses 
due to the distress of one or more banks. These can be easily evaluated by quantifying the 
consequences of the shock in terms of market capitalisation lost9. Say, for instance, that it is intended 
to know how much capitalisation node 1 would lose if node 10 was hit by a pre-determined 
distribution of shocks, such as the one presented in fig. 5.2. Once generate a matrix with random 
shocks extracted by the distribution (in this case, it is a truncated normal distribution with mean 0.5 
and standard deviation 0.05), it suffices to normalise the impact on node 1 by its market capitalisation 
value. The result is in fig. 5.3. The losses can be evaluated also for a group of nodes or for the entire 
network, as demonstrated by figures 5.4 and 5.5. Additionally, the distribution of losses can be 
evaluated conditional to a group of banks being in distress, not just one.  
The elasticity of this method allows the in-depth investigation of individual fragilities of a bank or of a 
group, by explicitly taking into account their interconnections with the entire system. The method, 
furthermore, enables the evaluation of Value at Risk (VaR) estimates, a tool that is already widely used 
by both regulators and the private sector. VaR measures the maximum potential loss of a financial 
value over a pre-determined time period within a confidence interval (Linsmeier and Pearson, 2000; 
Jorion, 2006). Analytically, it is defined as below (Artzer et al., 1999): 
 
𝑉𝑎𝑅𝛼(𝐿) = 𝑖𝑛𝑓{𝑙 ∈  ℝ ∶ (𝐏 > 𝐥) ≤ 𝟏 − 𝛼} 
Equation 5.1 Value at Risk 
                                                          
9
 Other ways of quantifying the losses, though, may well be acceptable. Possible instances include levels of total asset 
values burnt by the financial cascade, or losses in Tier 1 Capital.   
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Where: 
 
L is the underlying profit and loss probability distribution; 
α is a confidence level whose value is within the range [0,1]; 
l is the value at risk, or the minimum possible value of L such that the likelihood of losses exceeding l is 
(1 - α). 
 
In the losses distributions below, a VaR with α = 0.95 can be easily calculated, and would represent the 
maximum amount of losses in market capitalisation that would be experienced, with a 95% 
probability.  
 
Figure 5.2 Random shocks on node 10, extracted from 𝑵~(𝟎. 𝟓, 𝟎. 𝟎𝟓) 
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Figure 5.3 Losses distribution of node 1, due to the shocks simulated on node 10 
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Figure 5.4 Losses distribution of nodes 1 to 9, due to the shocks simulated on node 10 
 
Figure 5.5 Losses distribution of the entire financial network, due to the shocks simulated on node 10 
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Despite the valuable policy implications, the method and results of this paper still suffer from 
limitations, with a need for further work. These issues are tackled by the next Chapter. 
 
6. Limitations and way forward 
 
This work is not immune from limitations. This chapter elaborates three main shortcomings, 
respectively dealing with the validity of the uncertainty intervals, the lack of validation on a real world 
setting, and the presence of multiple types of interbank connections.  
 
Uncertainty intervals. The construction of ensembles composed of 50 networks has allowed the 
estimation of useful intervals for the impacts of the shocks simulated in the experiment. Yet, it is most 
likely that further research ought to feature ensembles with higher number of networks. This is mainly 
due to the uncertain form which the asymptotic density distributions of the ensembles possess. Larger 
ensembles would make the form of the distribution clear, thereby suggesting more mathematically 
rigorous ways of constructing the intervals. This has not been possible in this paper, primarily due to 
the increasing computational power needed to evaluate the shock impacts as the number of networks 
in the ensembles increases. Future work will overcome this issue by making use of more 
computationally powerful machines.  
 
Validation in a real world setting. The model is yet to be validated on real-world networks, or, at least, 
on networks reconstructed not simply from node attributes – as in this paper –, but also from partial 
network information. This, obviously, sheds some uncertainty as to whether the results gathered in 
this work apply on fully empirical financial networks. This issue will be addressed by using the model 
on UK interbank networks, estimated thanks to the information that the Bank of England conserve. 
This will not only allow the use of these methods for policy purposes, but it will also help adapting the 
model to real-world contexts. This task is planned to be completed over the second trimester of Year 2 
of the PhD program, as exhibited in table 6.1.  
 
Multiplex networks. Banks are not connected to each other simply by lending. In financial systems, 
there have been identified at least three levels of interactions (although, surely, a comprehensive 
analysis would find more): interbank lending (Iori, Jafarey and Padilla, 2006), overlapping portfolios 
(Caccioli et al., 2012), and derivatives contracts (Haldane, 2009). Without taking into account all these 
layers, a truly empirically valid answer to the research question cannot be found. Assuming 
information about such levels, it is possible to construct a multilayered network of banks, and simulate 
the propagation of one or more initial adverse events throughout the system, taking into account the 
different feedbacks that each layer engenders.  
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Figure 6.1 Depiction of a multilayer or multiplex network 
In order to quantify the systemic impact of shocks, a contagion algorithm that takes into account 
multiplex networks’ structures and dynamics should be applied. This method has not yet been 
developed, but it has been explored theoretically (Yağan and Gligor, 2012). Ideally, the Debtrank 
algorithm can be augmented to satisfy these conditions. As De Domenico et al. (2013) demonstrate, 
any mathematical formulations of conventional networks can be transposed to the greater 
dimensionality of multiplex networks by the use of tensors, geometric objects that allow to synthesise 
relations between vectors and matrices (Aris, 2012). Debtrank could simply be ameliorated by the 
insertion of tensor mathematical formulas of contagion. Given the data and the model used, it would be 
possible to assess how financial systems are affected by shocks with good precision and low levels of 
uncertainty. The inclusion of all modes of banks’ interaction would allow an informed simulation of the 
propagation of the shock through the system. This task is set to be explored over the last trimester of 
Year 2 and the first of Year 3. 
 
On another note, it is important to also provide an external validation of the model on novel socio-
economic systems, thus shedding more light onto how shocks propagates and impact them. A possible 
application domain is the world trade web.  
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7. Concluding remarks 
 
This paper has attempted to contribute to the study of financial shocks and contagion, with a major 
focus on the possibility to quantify how financial systems are affected by extreme adverse events. By 
adopting a complex networks framework, the research has advanced the use of DebtRank as an 
algorithm to quantity the impact of the distress of one or more institutions onto the wider system. The 
algorithm has been augmented with uncertainty intervals, and its performance has been successfully 
tested against an alternative method, the default contagion algorithm.  
The work has arrived to this contribution through the following steps. First, Chapter 2 has introduced 
the reader to the research question, explicating the consequences of financial crises on GDP growth 
and unemployment as part of the reasons behind its importance. It has then reviewed three main 
branches of the relevant literature. Indicator-based measures have been introduced. It has been shown 
that they make use of (mostly) publicly available data to devise indices stating how important a single 
financial institution is for the stability of the financial system. Nevertheless, it has been demonstrated 
that the methodology to construct this type of indices is not able to quantitatively capture the systemic 
effects of a market shock. Attention has then been shifted towards DSGE models. It has been argued, 
though, that the very assumption of general equilibrium and the poor complexity of the simulations 
make this approach fail in providing answers to the research question. As an alternative to the 
aforementioned works, complex networks analysis has been advanced. It has been stressed that the 
main strength of this approach is the recognition of the complex and nonlinear nature of financial 
systems dynamics, which allows for the creation of appropriate models and policy tools, such as the 
DebtRank algorithm. 
Chapter 3 has presented the methods behind the model. After having described the main network 
concepts used in the framework and having operationalised the main variables of interest with real-
world data, the chapter has provided an in-depth account of the main two modules of the model. The 
first module has the task of reconstructing networks from partial information, by the use of the fitness 
model. The algorithmic flow of the module has been explicated. The second module applies DebtRank 
and the default cascade algorithm on the ensembles estimated by the first module, thereby evaluating 
the impact of simulated shocks. The mathematical framework behind the two algorithms has been 
shown.  
Chapter 4 has been focused on the design of the experiment and on its results. The experiment 
involved the testing of DebtRank and the default contagion algorithm on three ensembles of 50 
networks with different densities, and gradually worse systemic conditions. It has been concluded that 
DebtRank performs better than the latter algorithm, as it is able to capture early warning signals of the 
gradual deterioration of the system’s conditions. On the other side, the default contagion algorithm 
failed to anticipate any distress, and provided impact values which are not adapt for the construction 
of uncertainty intervals.  
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Chapter 5 has discussed the policy implications of the findings of the paper. It has been suggested that 
three policy applications can potentially stem from this model, namely the monitoring of the systemic 
importance of banks over time, the stress-testing of one or more banks under a distribution of shock 
scenarios, and the quantification of losses endured by one or more financial institutions, conditional to 
the distress of other institutions. The latter application has been deemed particularly useful for the 
identification of Value at Risk values for financial systems.  
Finally, Chapter 6 has briefly overviewed the main limitations of the study. It has been contended that 
the construction of uncertainty intervals would benefit from larger ensembles, and that the model 
needs validation on real-world financial networks, such as the UK interbank market. Furthermore, it 
has been recognised the need to investigate financial contagion in the realm of multiplex networks, 
because financial institutions, after all, interact and affect each other on several different layers. The 
Chapter has also outlined a potential time schedule for the future work to be done by the completion of 
the PhD program.  
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